Ernest J. Moniz, EFIF Founder and CEO, was invited to publish an opinion piece in The Economist. The article was published on August 7, 2026. The full text can be found here and viewed below.
Enrichment technology is needed to supply fuel for nuclear reactors, but the same technology can make the fuel for a nuclear bomb. It should be no surprise, then, that the recent civil nuclear co-operation agreement between America and Saudi Arabia raises big questions about American nonproliferation policies and “norms”—the rules and understandings which, if shared with other states, discourage the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
The U.S.-Saudi deal is, potentially, the biggest development in nuclear diplomacy for years. President Donald Trump has signaled it may be contingent on the Saudis normalizing relations with Israel. That seems unlikely. But if the deal does come off it will shake up the Middle East’s nuclear dynamics. In Iran, nuclear weapons risks loom large in the current conflict because of the Islamic Republic’s uranium-enrichment capability. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has successfully developed a substantial nuclear-energy program and made strong nonproliferation commitments, including a renunciation of domestic uranium enrichment. Saudi Arabia aspires to join Iran and the UAE in generating nuclear power, but remains reticent about its possible military nuclear ambitions.
America calls deals such as that with Saudi Arabia “123 agreements”, after Section 123 of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, which requires a deal in order to export American nuclear technology or materials. These agreements have been used by America to promote the highest nuclear nonproliferation standards. So one in a region as geopolitically complex as the Gulf quickly leads to questions about possible proliferation.
The U.S.-Saudi agreement appears to be part of a bid by America to regain its position as a major purveyor of global nuclear technology and services, thereby reinforcing its traditional role as arbiter of nonproliferation norms. For their part, the Saudis want advanced technology for generating electricity, in time using their own uranium deposits. But the agreement also gives Saudi Arabia a path to uranium enrichment, albeit one with hurdles.
With this capability, Saudi Arabia would become a nuclear-weapons threshold state, capable, if it chose, of accomplishing the most difficult step in building a nuclear bomb, namely production or acquisition of the required nuclear material. Iran has already mastered the enrichment needed to produce bomb material, and demonstrated it by producing almost half a ton of highly enriched uranium, enough for several bombs. As far back as 2018, the Saudi crown prince blurted out the truth: “Without a doubt…[we will] follow suit as soon as possible” if Iran has a nuclear bomb. The conditions are ripe for a Gulf nuclear arms race, unless negotiations put sufficient safeguards in place for all to have confidence that no one is pursuing a nuclear bomb.
I suggest two approaches to address this situation outside the usual tired debates around enrichment. First, it should be noted that precluding enrichment is desirable but not essential for retaining strong nonproliferation norms. This was shown in the JCPOA, the nuclear agreement in 2015 between Iran and several world powers, including America, which permitted limited uranium enrichment for a time, combined with extraordinary verification and transparency requirements. Among them, Iran agreed to join the IAEA Additional Protocol in perpetuity, allowing international inspectors to uncover possible covert activities at undeclared nuclear sites. Iran also agreed to the unique requirement that access to undeclared sites be provided within 24 days. The U.S.-Saudi deal should allow uranium enrichment only if it is coupled with similarly strong verification measures. There is no indication that the signed document includes such provisions. There may be other ways to achieve this objective but, one way or another, it must be met.
Second, America should promote a regional nuclear fuel cycle. The idea is that the Gulf rivals would agree that each would host some part of the fuel cycle—the steps involved in producing electricity from uranium—but none would control the entire supply chain needed for civilian or military nuclear energy use. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran would be the core members, but others in the region might play a role, as could America. A precedent exists for this: in 1970 Britain, the Netherlands and West Germany formed the Urenco company to produce enriched uranium for peaceful applications.
During the negotiations in 2015, in which I was deeply involved, Iran raised this regional fuel cycle possibility, but it was premature at that time—a first agreement with world powers needed to be reached before this could be considered seriously. Recently, senior officials from Arab states have expressed interest in reviving the idea.
Today, with little serious negotiation about a long-term solution, such an approach would constitute a big step towards a peaceful arrangement between Iran, Arab states in the Gulf, and others. In light of the ongoing military tensions, going even bigger—by supplementing a nuclear deal with a regional arrangement to finance Iran’s reconstruction, structured as an investment that can produce reasonable returns—should be on the table, too. This would, of course, involve confronting ideological leaders of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards who have tightened their grip on the levers of power in Tehran, but also have huge commercial interests in a functioning Iranian economy. Crafting such a proposal would be difficult and involve many parties. The current American administration is not known for patience, but its transactional nature could, in this instance, be an advantage.
Ernest J. Moniz was America’s secretary of energy from 2013 to 2017. He is the founder and chief executive of the EFI Foundation, working on energy transition.
